The youth of India are very much in the news these days as the agitations for and against reservations in education and jobs pit them against each other.  Elsewhere we hear about the spread of Naxalism, a variety of other insurgencies and demonstrations against globalisation and liberalisation all of them based on youthful cadres.

At the same time one senses amongst many of them a sense of hope for the country and optimism about their own future. The most exciting thing about India today is the cockiness and self-confidence of young adults everywhere.

But this piece is not about the merits of the arguments that underlie the agitations and insurgencies or even the optimism.  It is about the young people themselves. It is about the impact that they are going to have on our politics and our economy and, hence, the enormous importance of securing their commitment to the processes of peaceful economic and social change. 

India is going to be a country where young adults will predominate.  The population projections up to the year 2020 presented in the table show no increase in the number of persons below the age of 15.  The entire increase will be in the population of young adults and older persons.

The economic implications of this are well understood.  In fact there is much talk of a demographic dividend.  The beneficial impacts of a rising proportion of young adults include high savings as these young adults save to buy houses, educate their children and provide for their retirement. It also means a young adaptable workforce ready to learn new skills.  It could mean higher mobility between sectors and possibly between regions as young adults are more willing to chance their luck in new activities and new locations.  It could mean a greater willingness to take risks.  All of this is good for growth if and only if these young adults have the opportunities for education and work.

A lot will depend on what we do with education. Clearly a huge expansion of higher education is necessary for economic reasons.  But more importantly, is our democratic polity viable if we do not give many more of our youth a chance to join the educated middle class?

The population projections in the table imply that even if only 20 % of the 15-24 age group go on to higher education the numbers in universities and similar institutions will go up to four to five fold from the present figure of about 10 million.  Do we have a higher education management system that is capable of this scale of expansion? We already bemoan the lowering in standards of university education.  What then will happen when we have five times as many universities?  We need a radical reconsideration of the present system with its heavy dependence on governmental guidance and consequent politicization.  But there is no sign of this happening under present dispensations.  Fortunately there is hope at the school end where with stable numbers we can aim at substantial quality improvements.

The impact of young India on politics can already be seen in the growing democratic vigour of public debate and the pressure on incumbents to perform and deliver. But not yet in actual governance and the frustrations that young people experience are at least a part of the explanation for the emergence of regional and sectarian party politics.

Sectarian and regional parties have grown but the continued survival of the Congress, and the vitality of the left parties demonstrated in the recent elections, shows the electoral value of a national and secular stance.  In fact, regional parties soon look for national influence, as we saw in the role that Chandrababu Naidu played in national politics in the NDA days. Even sectarian parties seek to appeal across caste and religious identities: Mayawati woos Brahmins and the BJP tries to appeal to minorities.

India has some features of an immigrant society.  Many who are entering the educated middle class, well paid skilled worker class or the public services come from historically underprivileged families, small towns and villages.  In their new milieu they are like immigrants and like immigrants elsewhere they are high savers, ambitious and value education highly since it is the main passport to advancement.  That is why access to education is so emotional an issue. And like immigrants elsewhere a hyphenated identity linking the old and the new locales anchors them psychologically. 

Leaving aside electoral politics and the divisive issue of reservations, people do not form their policy opinions on major policy issues on regional or even sectarian lines.  Is there a caste defined or region specific view of, say, the PDS system or land ceilings?  There may well be systematic differences on policy that correlate with economic status and that in turn may correlate with caste or religion. But the second correlation is getting much looser with the opening of opportunities.  There are now rich Brahmins and rich Mahars, rich Hindus and rich Christians who will all agree wholeheartedly that taxes should be reduced!

One can see this growing sense of unity of interest amongst young adults. The mobility of the educated young, which has escalated greatly with the InfoTech boom, contributes to this.  Hindi is spoken in Bangalore and Malayalam in Delhi and the boom in national TV helps in sustaining this composite culture. The shared taste in films and music and in fashion is another manifestation of this emerging identity.  But more than all this, it is the shared concerns about their economic future, the idealism about issues like environmental protection and the hopes generated by a booming economy that gives them a sense of common purpose.

The reservation agitation is a break in this emergence of Young India. I believe that many young persons, whether they are upper caste, OBCs or Dalits accept that neither caste nor parental wealth should be a predictor of life chances.  Let us ask them to work out how best this can be achieved instead of imposing old mens’ wisdom on them.